Game analysis of the status quo of China's motor vehicle insurance market theory

The insurance Department of Fudan University graduate student  Tian Gang

[Abstract]This paper introduced China's motor vehicle insurance market situation and2003Years of insurance management system reform of state, on the basis of this, by analyzing the principle of game theory for the profound reason produced this result using.

Key word.Motor vehicle insurance market  Reform of the vehicle insurance management system   Game theory

One, foreword

In China's insurance market especially in motor vehicle insurance market, the insurance industry occupies a very important position. According to statistics,2003The first three quarters, the property insurance premium income671.97Billion yuan, of which the motor vehicle insurance427.24Billion yuan, accounting for63.58%. But the average profits Juxian rate decreases,The compensation rate rising.2003In the first three quarters of the amount of the payment for insurance251.46Billion yuan, simple loss58.85%Over insurance, accepted55%The security line. Notable is, this is the2003Years1Month1Day China CIRC launched the national reform of the vehicle insurance management system,4Month1And the abolition of the date of2000Occurrence of insurance clause, premium version case, in-depth study of the reasons leading to this situation, to propose solutions to the problem, has certain practical significance.

Two,2003Years of insurance management system reform of state

At higher rates the original unified, our insurance company insurance premium income, of which a large part into the insurance agents especially as the hands of part-time agent car dealer, sometimes the proportion is as high as60%. Some car dealers and even forced tying some not compulsory insurance of insurance in the sales of motor vehicles, also refused to sell cars to people who don't want to buy auto insurance in their customers, in order to obtain high agency fees. Therefore in the auto insurance market that should be consumers, insurance companies, agents and social "four win" of the market, consumers and the interests of insurance companies are subject to damage, the whole social resource allocation is distorted. In order to change this situation, Chinese CIRC from2003Year in January 1st launched the reform of vehicle insurance management system, is intended to change the disorderly competition, protect the interests of the insured, the insurance market development specification. But the insurance agency costs remain high, the early breakthrough8%, most companies have been restored to15%-25%Level, individual or even more than30%. The new provision rates are down in general, therefore the insurance company profit space has not improved, but worse than before. By2003Years10At the end of the month, Shanghai insurance company insurance payment rate69.9%Vehicle insurance business, industry wide losses.

Game analysis of three, auto insurance agency costs theory

For auto insurance agents especially the profit distribution car dealers are too high, the insurance company will have the pain of cutting one's body. Early in the1995Years, the mediator, Taibao, Ping An insurance company jointly launched the uniform provision, uniform rate, uniform time the implementation of the new provisions; is the insurance firstly establish business Coordinating Committee and the joint meeting system,"Convention" established vehicle insurance self discipline. The CIRC start auto insurance system reform, the major insurance companies have formed an alliance to car dealers, consistent with8%The agent rate. But2003Years3Months ago the car dealer lots of detention policy, the insurance company insurance business less spectacular, under the pressure of the collapse of itself, the insurance company alliance. So, the crux of the problem is? Motor vehicle market in China especially high profile car market is still a seller's market, car dealers have more bargaining power than customers purchase a car, thus forcing customers to buy the insurance agent to a certain extent, otherwise it is the sales of vehicles. But in some supply abundant, car sales car itself competition fierce, such problems also exist. Careful observation, structure factors outside of the insurance market is not the root causes of this problem, the reason is very simple, the insurance company does not accept these business, business volume has declined, but did not result in a loss, there is no corresponding risk, on the contrary, the car dealer is not insurance, long-term detention policy once the accident, risk, will bring great risk to the insurance consciousness; at the same time, customers continue to enhance, more familiar with the business of insurance companies, direct marketing is more and more convenient, so customers have directly to the insurance company, insurance demand, so as long as the insurance companies implement8%The discount rate, the car dealer eventually have to compromise. So the crux of the problem is with the insurance company on the body. This paper attempts to apply the principle of the game theory, analyses the cause of this phenomenon.

One, the basic assumption:

Hypothesis1:Suppose that a representative of the insurance policy, unit salesRDirect cost, insurance companies areCAuto dealers, sales cost forK, andK<C≤R. The amount of aggregate demand policyQ.

Hypothesis2:Unless all the car dealer forcing customers to buy the buy the insurance at the same time, the customer to buy insurance for car dealers to insurance companies to buy insurance is no difference. As a corollary, cooperation with an insurance company car dealer number, the greater the insurance policy sales (note, here is the sales, not profits).

Hypothesis3:From the features of China's insurance industry is currently the status quo, supervision situation and capital intensive industries, China's insurance market is still the structure of oligopoly.

Hypothesis4:Repeated game.

Hypothesis5:The car dealer's goal is to maximize profit, have enough patience in a repeated game. The goal of the insurance company is to make a concrete analysis of.