The original address:Http://blog.renren.com/blog/246558060/742602460

In this paper, for the general reader can read the meter, with all big vernacular, do not use too much jargon, please the fans do not laugh at me......

Basic situation: 20:34, from Beijing south to Fuzhou train D301 from Hangzhou to Fuzhou, crashed into the South D3115 train tail

Model: D301 for CRH2E, and two carriages for two seat, other compartments for EMU sleeper lying generation seat. D3115 CRH1E, 15, 16, was the vehicle for a seat.

Location: Wenzhou City, Ningbo Taizhou Wenzhou line under the railway overpass Ao Lu, in the WenZhou South Railway Station to NATO 5 kilometers, the running time of 2min

Analysis: D301 by the Beijing Shanghai high speed railway, Shanghai Hangzhou intercity line, Xiao Yongxian, Yong Tai Wen, Wen Fu line operation, this should be arrived at WenZhou South Railway Station at 19:42 (19:40 minutes past the position), the actual delay of about 54min...... It seems the Beijing Shanghai High-speed Rail and meritorious service (>_<)

As you can see, the D301 train is the time point, otherwise no rain in 180km/h operation above situation. (above 180km/h can be determined, there are claims that the emergency braking of speed is 212km/h, know not)

D3115 after the Shanghai Kunming line, Xiao Yongxian, Yongtaiwen railway running, this should be arrived at WenZhou South Railway Station at 19:57. According to one day take the car off at Wenling Railway Station said the passenger, D3115 time stop at Wenling Railway Station and punctual send (19:24 departure from Wenling). According to another passenger micro-blog, train at YongJia Railway Station (that is, before the accident should be docked at the last station, from the WenZhou South Railway Station only 10 minutes) at dozens of minutes, the conductor to the passenger explained that because of the weather reason "thunder, pause, to ensure safety". The train departs from the YongJia Railway Station at about 20:20, according to the line next to the residents before the incident micro-blog argument is "EMU storm rain this is how?? Climbing is slower than a snail... Don't out what thing ah... (20:27 a)"

First explain, how to prevent the occurrence of rear end collision under normal operation condition of the train

The first line of defense, is of high speed train (including the EMU train) a set of signal system unique, popular point is the vehicle through the operation of on-board equipment will train (including the location, speed and so on) to the dispatch center;

The second line is the railway more than 100 years have been used an approach, namely block control. The railway is divided into block sections "" (each a few kilometers), in the same interval is not allowed by the two train at the same time. When a vehicle running on the track, wheel on two tracks lead, testing equipment to define the interval of a car, and then change the signal signal and the interval between the upper (locomotive cab signal display signal);

The third line is the radio vehicle or driver hand-held, train once the non normal parking, in accordance with the regulations must be reported to the dispatch immediately;

The fourth line of defence is the driver of the lookout.

According to the official statement, the accident is caused by the collapse of the first line of Defense: D3115 electronic equipment failure, unable to transmit fault information control center, the control center did not send to slow or stop signal to the D301.

The second line of defense? There is a need to explain, is that the new high-speed dedicated passenger line (only run EMU) is no longer in use block control old-fashioned, because EMU often tracking operation with high density, if early four interval reduction would influence the running efficiency. However, even this line, in orbit is a sensor, the C2 system will be based on these sensors send information to the cab signal display signal. Moreover, Ningbo Taizhou Wenzhou line for line for mixed passenger and freight traffic, since the design to the truck, it is still the old block control system, but at the time of the accident is enabled is a question.

As for the third and fourth line of defense, apparently belonging to the driver and scheduling dereliction of duty (D3115 drivers and non D301 driver, D301 driver in heavy rain can not be seen parked D3115 is normal).

In general, the accident that reflects at least the following four points problem.

1, the vehicle system: system why so unreliable, that lightning was to destroy it? In the design process is not sufficient and the backup safety redundancy?

2, operation management question: since that backup and safety redundancy, why also arrange vehicles at such a high density following operation, in heavy rain cases still arrange D301 runs at a high speed?

3, line system problems: if lightning also destroyed the interval of the second defense, then it should be normal D301 driver saw neither red nor yellow or green, but should be white "no signal" logo, in this case the train control system will automatically stop. But according to reports, collision D301 cab signal display lights two.

4, the driver, scheduling responsibility. The front driver shall immediately by radio to the dispatch reported in train operation is not normal or line stop, then scheduling will be transmitting to the train stop orders. This section of line two train interval cannot be less than 5 minutes, 5 minutes can completely meet the drivers report to dispatcher and dispatching command parking, however D3115 non normal parking did not take timely measures! In addition, according to the provisions of the driver should be placed after the main parking sign or fireworks mark on the train tail, D3115 driver that bad weather low visibility is not according to the prescribed place logo, the D301 driver failed to observe the front car, appear.

To sum up, can be identified the accident as a major liability accident, it is man-made instead of natural disasters, hope that the Ministry of Railways don't always put the "lightning" this ridiculous in front of the mouth, as soon as possible to identify the responsibility of relevant personnel, treatment. More importantly, immediately enhance the security of signal system, increase the backup and safety redundancy; do not like, how big a bowl to eat much of the food security, according to the existing conditions reasonably arrange the work schedule and operation scheme, and resolutely put an end to this kind of accident from happening again.